Social Structure and Political Crisis in Brazil by Costa, Sérgio
desiguALdades.net
Research Network on Interdependent
Inequalities in Latin America
Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 99, 2016
Millionaires, the Established, Outsiders and the Precariat
Social Structure and Political Crisis in Brazil
Sérgio Costa
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series
Published by desiguALdades.net International Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in 
Latin America 
The desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series serves to disseminate first results of ongoing research 
projects in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the 
desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series does not constitute publication and should not limit 
publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. 
Copyright for this edition: Sérgio Costa
Editing and Production: Barbara Göbel / Paul Talcott
All working papers are available free of charge on our website www.desiguALdades.net. 
Costa, Sérgio 2016: “Millionaires, the Established, Outsiders and the Precariat: Social Structure and 
Political Crisis in Brazil”,  desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series 99, Berlin: desiguALdades.net 
International Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.
Sérgio Costa is Principal Investigator of desiguALdades.net and Coordinator of Cluster A: Global 
Structuration of Inequalities.
desiguALdades.net International Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America 
cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained 
in this Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and 
do not necessarily reflect those of desiguALdades.net.
Millionaires, the Established, Outsiders and the Precariat
Social Structure and Political Crisis in Brazil
Sérgio Costa
Abstract
The present paper draws on works that combine Marxist and Weberian traditions of 
social structure analysis to interpret the contemporary Brazilian political crisis as a 
distributive conflict involving four classes or strata (precariat, outsiders, established, 
millionaires), defined using five determinant vectors of social inequality: wealth, 
position, knowledge, selective association and existential rights. The four classes or 
strata considered saw their wealth, their existential rights, and their knowledge grow 
in the period between 2003 and 2013. However, in this period, the precariat and the 
outsiders ascended significantly in their social position, while the established lost 
social position to the extent that their power to exclude outsiders from social spaces 
formerly reserved for their own usage diminished. The same logic applies to selective 
associations with regard to gender and race, since during the Workers’ Party (PT) 
administrations there was a decrease in the power of men and whites to discriminate 
against women and blacks. This loss of position in the hierarchies of class, gender and 
race fed the resentment of the established against the PT government even in times 
when, in terms of wealth, they experienced an ascendant trajectory. Starting in 2014, 
the picture changed. The exacerbation of the economic crisis caused all of the strata, 
especially the outsiders, to lose wealth.  The established, though less threatened by 
the outsiders (the most affected by the crisis), also experienced social decline as the 
recession advanced. Finally, the millionaires who had until then been gaining at all of 
the levels of inequality with the PT governments, lost at least part of their selective 
associations as the investigations into corruption advanced. It is precisely when the 
millionaires began to lose that effective changes in favor of the removal of the president 
began to occur.
Keywords: class analysis | political crisis | distributive conflict | impeachment | Brazil
Biographical Notes
Sérgio Costa is Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Latin American Studies 
and Institute of Sociology at Freie Universität Berlin. He is a Co-Spokesperson of 
desiguALdades.net, and in the second phase of the project (May 2014 - April 2016) 
coordinator of the Research Cluster A: Global Structuration of Inequalities. His 
disciplinary interests are political sociology, comparative sociology and contemporary 
social theory. He has specialized in democracy and cultural difference, racism 
and antiracism, as well as social inequalities and transnational politics. Among his 
recent publications are: “Social Sciences and North-South-Asymmetries: Towards a 
Global Sociology”, in: Broeck, Sabine and Juncker, Carsten (eds.), Postcoloniality 
- Decoloniality - Black Critique: Joints and Fissures, Frankfurt, New York: Campus 
(2014); “Protection without Redistribution? Conceptual Limitations of Policies Meant 
to Reduce Inequalities Concerning Race and Gender in Brazil”, in: Fritz, Barbara 
and Lavinas, Lena (eds.), A Moment of Equality for Latin America? Challenges for 
Redistribution, Farnham: Ashgate, 235-252; and with G. L. Gonçalves “The Global 
Constitutionalization of Human Rights: Overcoming Contemporary Injustices or 
Juridifying Old Asymmetries?”, in: Current Sociology, Special issue, January 2016.
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Classes and Strata Matter: Reconciling Marx and Weber 1
3. Social Structure and Distributive Disputes in Brazil 6
3.1 Classes and Social Inequality in Contemporary Brazil 6
3.2 Recent Changes in the Brazilian Social Structure 10
3.2.1 The Precariat 12
3.2.2 The Outsiders 13
3.2.3 The Established 15
3.2.4 The Millionaires 17
4. Capital, Labor, State and the Crisis in Brazil 18
5. Conclusion 23
6. Bibliography 25
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 99 | 1
1. Introduction
In an article written during one of the most acute moments of the current Brazilian 
crisis in 2016, University of London economist Saad-Filho (2016: n.p.) described 
Brazil`s situation as a “dreamland for social scientists [and] the nightmare for everyone 
else.”  He was right. On the one hand, the crisis led to weaker institutions, lower formal 
employment and higher household debt. The GDP annual growth rate fell from 7.6% in 
2010 to 0.1% in 2014 and contracted 3.8% in 2015. On the other hand, the crisis fueled 
the curiosity of social scientists. They wanted to uncover the political polarization of 
a country that, notwithstanding its violent past, had experienced all major transitions 
– including independence, the abolition of slavery and proclamation of the republic 
in the 19th century, as well as democratic transitions in the 20th century – not through 
revolution, but through agreements between elites. According to the terms of public 
discourse in Brazil, poverty can be reduced as long as the gains of the wealthy are not 
affected, so how is it possible that the country is divided between two irreconcilable 
blocks, one supporting and the other opposing the government led by the Worker’s 
Party (PT)?
This essay1 is an attempt to explain this paradoxical situation by resorting to class 
analysis. Initially, I recover some of the central arguments supporting the timeliness of 
the concept of classes under late capitalism. I subsequently seek to understand recent 
changes in the Brazilian social structure, and then interpret the contemporary Brazilian 
political crisis as an expression of distributive conflicts. 
2. Classes and Strata Matter: Reconciling Marx and Weber
Starting in the 1940s, the study of social stratification from a functionalist perspective 
became hegemonic in the field of sociological studies on social inequality, at least 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. According to this perspective, inequality is functional and 
necessary for societies, to the extent that those who engage in socially relevant 
activities and/or have a higher level of “training or talent” should be rewarded with more 
resources (Daves and Moore 1944: 243). Although they share a staunch opposition to 
this functionalist reading, inequality research following the Weberian tradition and the 
Marxist tradition evolved independently from each other in the post-war period. Only 
recently, efforts to bring those two traditions together have become more visible.
In their many variants, Marxist approaches share at least two common premises, 
namely: (1) they consider that the capital/work relation structures social classes to the 
1 Iasmin Goes and Clay Johnson have translated the original text of this paper from Portuguese into 
English, including all quotations. 
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extent that those with the means of production are the owning or dominant class and 
those who sell their labor power form the working or dominated class; (2) they establish 
a necessary logical link between belonging to a structural class and cultural and 
political choices. This means that if the working class does not display the cultural and 
political behavior corresponding with its structural condition, this is due to ideological 
deviations (Wright 1985).
Approaches based on Weber share the Marxist claim that social classes are a shaping 
principle of the social structure of modern societies. However, they disagree with 
Marxists when questioning the necessary link between class – understood as class 
situation, that is, as the material insertion in the social structure – and forms of action 
and behavior, both in the cultural and political level. Thus, the Weberian tradition rejects 
any political determinism stemming from class situation or position. In the words of 
Weber himself, people belonging to the same class may, under certain circumstances, 
act politically in favor of their common interests as a community of interests, “but it 
does not have to be so; in any way, a class is not a community [Gemeinschaft] and to 
treat classes as a conceptual synonym for communities leads to distortions” (Weber 
1956 [1922]: 533). On the other hand, in the sense that a class is defined by a group 
of people sharing a “specific determinant of their vital chances” (Weber 1956 [1922]: 
531), namely, the place occupied in the hierarchies of wealth distribution, rather than 
whether or not they own the means of production, the positions possible in the social 
structure reproduce themselves beyond the owning and the working class conceived 
in Marxism.
In addition, as shown by Parkin (1972, 1974), there is another reason for the multitude 
of structural positions in Weber’s model, namely, the variety of strategies of social 
closure in class formation: 
By social closure, Weber means the process by which social collectivities 
seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunities 
to a limited circle of eligible individuals. This entails the singling out of certain 
identifiable social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion 
(Parkin 1974: 3). 
To the extent that strategies of social closure go beyond the struggle to own the 
means of production, the existing class positions are also broadened. Following this 
reasoning, the distinction between strata and classes is no longer relevant. That is, it 
makes no analytical difference whether we refer to classes or strata, provided class 
or stratum are used as categories that define comprehensive positions in the social 
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structure with their respective strategies of social closure, and not just income groups, 
as functionalist stratification studies do.
The links between power asymmetries and social inequalities, as outlined by Weber, 
are also present in the work of Norbert Elias. The model of an established-outsider 
figuration, developed by Elias and Scotson (1994 [1965]), deserves here particular 
attention. It was based on the study of discrimination and stigmatization processes of 
new residents in a small English suburban town named Winston Parva. As shown by 
the two authors, in this figuration, that is, in this web of interdependencies, established 
residents use all possible means – from defamation to the construction of access 
barriers – to jettison newcomers from social spaces as well as to prevent their use 
of public and symbolic goods available in the community. According to the authors, 
the exclusionary practices within this figuration were not cultural or physical marks 
that differentiated the established group from the outsider group, but rather the power 
asymmetries that allowed the established group to give meaning to apparent traits, such 
that self-ascribed marks were decoded as symbols of superiority and instruments that 
legitimized advantages and privileges. In opposition, inferiority marks were assigned to 
outsiders to legitimize the barring of their access to socially valued goods and spaces:
Thus one encountered in this small community what appeared to be an 
universal regularity of any established-outsider figuration: The established 
group attributed to its members superior human characteristics; it excluded all 
members of the other group from non-occupational social contact with its own 
members; the taboo on such contacts was kept alive by means of social control 
such as praise-gossip about those who observed it and the threat of blame-
gossip against suspected offenders (Elias and Scotson 1994 [1965]:  xvi).
Among the contributions that sought to reconcile the Marxist and Weberian traditions to 
understand the role of classes in constituting the inequalities that shape contemporary 
societies, it is worth highlighting the work of Reinhard Kreckel (1992 in particular) 
and Göran Therborn (2013 in particular). In his quest to build a political sociology of 
social inequality, Kreckel first reinterprets Weber and Marx, showing that there is a 
widespread misunderstanding in the reception of Weber when it comes to the three 
terms appearing in Part Two, Chapter 8, Section 6 of Economy and Society dedicated 
to the study of Political Communities. Section 6 was originally titled “Machtverteilung 
innerhalb der Gemeinschaft: Klassen, Stände, Parteien” (Power Distribution within the 
Community: Classes, Estates of the Realm, Parties) and is wrongly understood as 
the material (classes), symbolic (status groups) and power (parties) dimensions of the 
 Costa: Social Structure and Political Crisis in Brazil | 4
existing inequalities.2 As convincingly shown by Kreckel (1992: 57-63, 69-70), class 
does indeed correspond to the structural-material dimension of inequalities. However, 
Stände in Weber’s work do not concern the symbolic dimension, but rather the extent 
of interactions, relationships and social networking among peers, something close to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979) notion of social capital. And parties, in turn, cannot correspond 
to the power dimension. After all, power is not one single dimension of inequality in 
Weber’s reading, but a transversal category that permeates all other dimensions.
Kreckel understands that the sociological interpretation is always “a difficult balance 
between generalizing and historicizing” (Kreckel 1992: 76). Accordingly, he aims to 
adapt and expand to a contemporary context the sources or vectors of social inequality 
identified by Marx and Weber, respectively the market or capitalist economy and the 
“‘exclusivity’ of relationships and loyalties”. Thus, to meet the analytical needs of late 
capitalism, Kreckel adds two new dimensions of inequality, hierarchy and knowledge, 
establishing a matrix with four vectors that produce vertical inequalities in contemporary 
societies:
(1) Material wealth, including property, means of production, income and other assets 
that can be converted into the general equivalent: money;
(2) Positions in hierarchical organization, including ranks occupied by individuals in 
organizations on the job market or other spheres of social life, which, following 
the “meritocratic ideology”, are linked to different levels of prestige, power and 
compensation;
(3) Symbolic knowledge, understood as socially valued knowledge. It is a diffuse 
category that expresses skills valued and required in contemporary capitalism. 
Overall, the general equivalents to this dimension are degrees and titles; and
(4) Selective association: this dimension is translated into different degrees of group 
belonging (ethnic, gender, regional, etc.), usually informally established, and that 
guarantee benefits and privileges to its members. 
To give this analytical matrix its proper historical sense, Kreckel applies it to the study 
of German society (indeed, to 1980s West Germany), in order to analyze: (1) to what 
2 This also happens in Chapter 4, “Stände und Klassen”, mistakenly translated into English as “Status 
Groups and Classes”. The Spanish translation, published in Mexico by Fondo de Cultura Económica 
for the first time in 1944, is faithful to the original and translates Stände as estamentos (i.e. estates). 
Nevertheless, the contemporary reception of Weber in Brazil was heavily influenced by the American 
literature and often commits the mistake of translating Stände as grupos de status (i.e. status groups).
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extent the differences relating to the four features outlined above (money, rank, degrees 
and membership) lead to the formation of “‘real’ social classes” (Kreckel 1992: 150); 
and (2) how specific forces correlate to maintain or alter a “specific system of social 
inequality” (Kreckel 1992: 150).
Kreckel answers both questions by building a force field model, according to which 
effective inequality is the result of distributional disputes among three corporate actors: 
state, capital and wage labor, through the institutions and organizations that represent 
them. Around this core, interest groups represent specific forces and social movements. 
Finally, “on the outskirts of the force field is the socially structured population that 
reflects the social conditions of inequality for everyday life, from values and potentials 
for action defined according to their stratum, environment or specific condition” (Kreckel 
1992: 161).
Unlike Kreckel, Therborn (2013) is not concerned with developing a systematic theory 
of class or inequality. Still, writing over twenty years after publication of Kreckel’s classic 
book, the Swedish author draws attention to overseen or underdeveloped aspects, 
allowing for a completion of Kreckel’s political sociology of inequality in at least three 
fundamental ways that serve our goals in this essay:
(1) By distinguishing between three dimensions of inequality, namely, vital inequality, 
existential inequality, and resource inequality. Vital and resource inequality can be 
subsumed under the category of wealth inequality in terms of Kreckel, but existential 
inequality seems to be a dimension of its own that Kreckel fails to cover. To Therborn, 
this is the “unequal allocation of personhood, i.e., of autonomy, dignity, degrees of 
freedom, and of rights to respect and self-development” (Therborn 2013: 49).
(2) By considering the global dimension of inequalities: Therborn draws attention to the 
fact that the nation, that is, the nation-state, alongside capitalism and families, has 
become one of the institutions buttressing the reproduction of inequalities: 
Under post-1990 globalization, however, national cohesion and equality have 
been dumped for national attractiveness of foreign capital, in China and Vietnam 
as well as in Argentina, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In this way, nations 
have become territories of cheap bodies, pimped by their elites to foreign 
capital, and as such almost unprecedented generators of inequality. [...] Nations 
and national boundaries [...] provide the national pimp governments with their 
exorbitant rents, and they constitute major barriers of exclusion to poor migrants 
(Therborn 2013: 175).
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Therborn does not deny that nation-states also may, in some periods and cases, 
exercise their historically assigned role of controlling the influence of capitalism on 
generating social inequalities and imploding social solidarity ties. After all, nation-
states foster ownership ties, taxes as well as social and labor rights. Nevertheless, 
national states competing to attract capital and investors have recently increased 
inequalities and compressed both social and labor rights.3
(3) Middleclassization: Therborn draws attention to an important development in the 
global dynamics of social classes: The decline – at least on a discursive level – in the 
importance of the working class as a collective subject and in the generalization of 
discourses on the middle class. This obviously has nothing to do with the hypothesis 
of structural leveling of global inequalities, which are increasing. In truth, these are 
ideological discourses that – according to Therborn – go in two different directions: 
the suffering and “larmoyant” tone of the American upper middle class, which has 
supposedly been “left behind the soaring oligarchy of current financial capitalism” 
(Therborn 2013: 178); and the discourse of the middle classes in the Global South 
which, inflated by international agencies and business consultancies, goes against 
the former, being “jubilant, telling about the arrival or the imminent coming of the 
Messiah, in the shape of consuming middle class” (Therborn 2013: 178). 
3. Social Structure and Distributive Disputes in Brazil
3.1 Classes and Social Inequality in Contemporary Brazil 
Most of the categories that make up the political sociology of social inequality developed 
by Kreckel can be usefully applied to analyze the Brazilian social structure and the 
transformations it underwent in recent years.
First, the four vectors or dimensions of social inequalities – namely, material wealth, 
positions in hierarchical organizations, symbolic knowledge and selective association 
– are also central in the formation of Brazilian social stratification. However, one must
expand the category of the position in hierarchical organizations, as defined by Kreckel, 
to also consider social spaces organized hierarchically, but which do not constitute an 
organization itself. This includes leisure spaces (recreational clubs, concert halls, etc.) 
or even purchases and services (shopping malls, airports) in which discretionary criteria 
3 The distinct dimensions in which national citizenship works as social closure, in the sense of 
reproducing inequalities between members of different national states, are developed comme il faut 
by Boatcă (2015: 177).
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for access (economic or informal) are applicable.4 Attending these spaces represents 
an important dimension of the class experience in Brazil. As a consequence, preventing 
new aspirants to such spaces to accede is a particular form of social closure. 
Furthermore, it is worth adding a fifth vector of inequality ignored by Kreckel, possibly 
due to its in comparison with Brazil lower empirical significance in Germany: existential 
inequality. This can be measured as the difference in ensuring existential rights, 
namely the right to respect and self-development, as defined by Therborn above. The 
significant percentage of the economically active population working in the informal 
sector without any labor guarantees, the systematic violation of civil rights by state 
and private actors, and unequal access to justice justify addressing the existential 
hierarchies as a separate dimension of the existing inequalities in Brazil.5
Once this addition is made, the positions occupied in the hierarchy of possession of or 
access to each of these five features determine the classes and strata in the Brazilian 
social structure, at least in general terms.6 They also define fairly clear groups, based 
on ethno-racial categories and gender.7 As will be seen below, this statement does 
not imply a total overlap of strata arising from the five vectors. Nevertheless, the trend 
4 These spaces reflect and reproduce social hierarchies in a multitude of ways: through an architecture 
that often hinders the access of the carless or ensures more comfort and agility in service to those 
willing to spend more; through overt surveillance of “intruders”, defined by appearance, ethno-racial 
criteria, etc. Several case studies based on ethnography or discourse analysis show how these 
hierarchies operate, as is the case of research conducted in Belo Horizonte: “The results demonstrate 
the symbolic sense of a mall as a space of social segregation that should implicitly be restricted to a 
specific portion of society to be considered a valued, safe space with social distinction” (Nascimento 
et al. 2015: 260).
5 Strictly speaking, one would have to include a sixth vector of inequality – the ecological dimension 
(see Dietz 2014). The expanded production of commodities created new environmental risks and 
damages to the rural population, while the dramatic increase in the number of cars and motorcycles 
circulating in the cities deteriorated the quality of urban life, affecting different social classes and strata 
unequally. The present essay does not take this sixth dimension into account, given the difficulties in 
estimating its impact on the social structure. 
6 Following the consolidated and prestigious tradition of studies on milieus in Germany (e.g.: Vestler 
2001), Kreckel draws attention to the need to also consider milieus and macro-milieus as aggregates 
of social structure. Though the research on milieus can be meaningful and useful in examining 
individualization processes, the importance of milieus is secondary when it comes to the analysis of 
vertical structuring processes in unequal societies like Brazil.
7 Part of the literature on social inequalities distinguishes between vertical inequality, like the one 
concerning the distribution of population by classes or strata, and horizontal inequality, referring to 
the inequality between groups organized by gender or sex, ethnicity, race or other relevant variable 
(Stewart 2000, 2010). However, inequalities between men and women, on the one hand, and blacks 
and whites, on the other, are so sharp, lasting and widespread in Brazilian society that I consider 
it more appropriate to adopt three complementary levels or lines of vertical social asymmetries: 
classes or strata, sex or gender, and race or skin color (Guimarães 2002). Regional inequalities 
between residents in rural and urban areas are equally expressive. Nevertheless, these inequalities 
cannot be integrated as an additional variable into the analysis of the national social structure since 
they do not represent structural but spatial categories. 
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towards their convergence is undeniable, such that they define a vertical system of 
social structuring that is reasonably consistent and convergent with regard to the 
different dimensions of inequality. Thus, the stratum with the least material resources 
occupies the lowest positions in hierarchically organized organizations and spaces. 
These individuals are also those who hold less symbolic knowledge, who have 
less access to powerful selective associations and whose existential rights are less 
protected.
The concrete mechanisms and dynamics leading to both the perpetuation and the 
displacements or transformations in this system of vertical inequalities in contemporary 
Brazil are certainly quite different from those identified by Kreckel in his study of 1980s 
West Germany, marked by a comprehensive and protective social welfare state. 
Nevertheless, the abstract description of the distributional disputes in German society, 
as offered by Kreckel, also applies to the Brazilian case. This means that in Brazil, 
too, these disputes take place in a force field comprising three corporate hubs: state, 
capital and labor. Institutionally, political parties are the main actors behind distributional 
negotiations. Legally established interest groups, such as business associations or 
trade unions, also participate in these disputes. Also relevant are informal networks 
among representatives of the three corporate hubs, highlighting the links between 
actors linked to capital and state. However, Kreckel does not consider informal channels 
in his model. In case of Brazil (to a great extent also in Germany), these channels 
are essential in the reproduction the system of inequalities and constitute a central 
mechanism for the strategies of social closure adopted by the wealthiest.
There are two further important additions to Kreckel’s model. The first is the role of 
social movements, which – according to Kreckel – also interferes in disputes between 
the three corporate hubs whenever they have distributional demands. In this regard, 
the author’s model is dated and is far behind the current state of the art in the studies 
on social movements and public space. A wide range of investigations, both conceptual 
and specific to Latin America (Habermas 1992, Avritzer and Costa 2004), showed 
that concrete actors (such as social movements, non-governmental organizations, 
pressure groups, mass media, etc.) as well as the formation of public opinion and 
political will at the level of the public sphere are key to the legitimization of inequality or 
of the struggle for equality. This means that public debates do not merely influence the 
choices and preferences of voters, they also articulate themselves with the decision-
making bodies in the corporate field, guiding and legitimizing decisions, including those 
with distributive impact. 
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The second addendum concerns the role of the international context in distributional 
disputes between the three hubs: capital, labor and the state. The topic is certainly vast 
and involves discussing the inclusion of a country in the world economy, since – for 
example – there is evidence of a positive correlation between the production and export 
of primary goods and inequality levels (see Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009). It also 
involves analyzing various external linkages and flows, from the international transfer 
of profits and immigrants’ remittances to cooperation agreements and international 
treaties concerning social or cultural rights. The latter may impact the social structure 
at the national level by inhibiting race or gender discrimination, for instance. Based 
on Therborn’s observations, as shown above, we must also consider that states 
alter established distributive parameters to create internal conditions that are more 
conducive to attracting foreign investment. Through instruments such as tax breaks, 
suppression of labor rights or grants and special rights to investors, states can foster 
the concentration of wealth and entitlements in a given country.
The diagram below presents the model developed by Kreckel, incorporating the 
restrictions and additions discussed previously. 
Figure 1: Social Structure in Brazil
Source: Own elaboration, starting from Kreckel (1992)
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3.2 Recent Changes in the Brazilian Social Structure
On 1 January 2003, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a migrant from the Brazilian Northeast 
and former metalworker in São Bernardo do Campo (in the industrial area of São 
Paulo), was sworn in as the president of Brazil. His first term gave rise to a power 
system André Singer (2012) termed Lulism, implying a double strategy that maintained 
an orthodox economic policy with high interest rates, floating exchange rate and 
balanced public budget while strongly expanding social disbursements and raising 
the minimum wage in real terms proportional to the country’s economic growth. 
This strategy ensures gains for both the rich, who were exempt from tax increases 
or confiscation of goods or assets, and for the poor, who would benefit from cash 
transfer programs as well as from the expected economic growth that would yield them 
new economic opportunities. From the political-institutional point of view, this power 
system was supported by the coalitions between Workers’ Party (PT), created during 
social struggles against the military dictatorship (1964-1985), and several conservative 
parties. To form a parliamentary majority, the PT initially paid deputies and senators 
directly for their support, in a practice that became known as mensalão, literally a 
big monthly allowance. However, the practice was reported in 2005 and the ministers 
in charge of operating the scheme were at first exonerated and later punished. The 
alternative, then, was to construct a parliamentary majority by using tools that are 
widespread in Brazilian politics, namely, by handing over ministries and offices to 
allied politicians and political parties. (Nobre 2013, Anderson 2013) These positions 
are strategic not only to place allies, but also to control the concession of contracts with 
the government and other advantages, which are used as a bargaining chip to extract 
illicit payments from beneficiary companies. These payments, in turn, go to party funds 
or into the pocket of the involved politicians. Hence these positions are known in emic 
vocabulary of Brazilian politicians as fabriquinhas, i.e. little factories (Franco 2016: 2). 
This unconventional power system proved extremely successful, ensuring Lula’s re-
election in 2006; the election of his chosen successor, then-unknown Dilma Rousseff, 
in 2010; and her re-election in 2014 (even though the signs of Lulism’s exhaustion were 
evident from 2013 onwards). Between 2003 and 2013, Brazil’s GDP grew 64% and the 
percentage of the population living in poverty was halved, according to measurements 
based on monthly income. In addition, social spending grew significantly, the minimum 
wage increased by 75% in real terms and millions of new formal jobs were created 
every year (Bielschowsky 2014, Pochman 2014). These changes led the Brazilian 
government itself as well as international organizations (like the World Bank 2013) 
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and even researchers (Neri 2008)8 to celebrate the new or emerging Brazilian middle 
class, in a very similar manner to the messianic pathos described by Therborn, as 
shown above. In due course, some Brazilian social scientists criticized the rushed 
enthusiasm about the new middle class, pointing at the conceptual limits of Neri’s 
and other works that followed a similar line of argument. For example, Souza (2013, 
2015) properly recovers the variable of social and cultural capital, as developed 
by Bourdieu, to understand the class divisions in Brazil. Nevertheless, he dilutes 
the analytical strength of his argument by operating with categories like “rabble” or 
“fighters”, which are more representative of political-moral profiles than of positions in 
the social structure. Similarly, the author identifies positions in the academic debate 
employing qualifications such as “foolish” or “manipulated by the elite”, both of which 
are more appropriate in moral judgments and in certain forms of political struggle than 
in the sobriety of different theoretical interpretations and positions found within the 
sophisticated debate about social inequalities in Brazil.
In contrast, the critique of the “new middle class” thesis, stemming from authors like 
Xavier Sobrinho (2011), Scalon/Salata (2012), Quadros et al. (2013) and Pochmann 
(2014), adds indicators other than income to the study of social structure, thereby 
providing important resources to understand the changes in the Brazilian social 
pyramid in the years preceding the political crisis that started in 2013. These studies 
and others that will be mentioned in due course, in addition to statistical information, 
provide evidence of the profound changes in the Brazilian social structure, between 
2003 and 2013 as well as ever since.9 
To analyze these changes, we go back to the five vectors of inequality highlighted 
above, namely wealth, symbolic knowledge, positions in hierarchical organizations, 
8 In a later work, Neri (2012) seeks to reply, at least implicitly, to the critique of the conceptual limits of 
his model, emphasizing the need to incorporate “symbolic aspects of the middle class” (Neri 2012: 
79). Nevertheless, he resorts to the same analytical matrix adopted previously. Based on the income 
criterion, societies are divided into classes A to E. As a result, the middle class is the intermediate 
statistical group C.
9 A significant part of the secondary sources consulted uses not individuals, but families as the unit 
of analysis to study the changes in the social structure. This captures the role of families in the 
reproduction of social inequality in the terms mentioned above. At the same time, the information 
on families tends to overlook the gender gap. In addition to demographic censuses (which have the 
disadvantage of being decennial and having long processing times), studies on inequality in Brazil 
basically rely on information collected by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics through 
the annual National Household Survey (Pesquisas Nacionais de Amostra por Domícilio, PNAD) and 
the micro-census POF (Pesquisas de Orçamento Familiar, or Household Budget Survey), whose 
results have so far been released for two periods, 2002-2003 and 2008-2009. More recently, the 
database of the Brazilian Revenue Service, which brings together all income tax returns, has been 
used in studies on inequality and tax progressivity (Castro 2014). The tax data are mainly indicated 
to measure the concentration of income at the top of the social pyramid, which appears to be 
underestimated in household samples.
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selective association and existential rights. The aim of this exercise is not a detailed 
study of the Brazilian social structure through precise quantification of the mobility of 
different groups. The central goal is to identify trends in structural shifts which, according 
to the adopted hypothesis, led to the current crisis. Therefore, there is no concern 
here in naming classes or social strata that cover the entire Brazilian population, but 
only those whose upward or downward mobility may help explain the crisis. According 
to this logic, it is particularly interesting to follow the movements of four strata: the 
precariat, the outsiders, the established (middle class) and the millionaires. 
3.2.1 The Precariat
Nancy Fraser suggests adopting the expression “transnational precariat” in place of 
“the global poor” to refer to the segment of the global population subjected to different 
forms of exclusion which “arise from the convergence of multiscale processes, as when 
global economic structures intersect with local status hierarchies and national political 
structures” (Fraser 2010: 370). In focusing on Brazilian social structures, this paper 
adopts the expression precariat to refer to the part of the population that occupies the 
most inferior positions in Brazilian social hierarchies. In reference to the debate on 
scales of inequality and of justice, it is warned that these positions, even when they 
are understood in their national dimension, reflect the entanglements between the 
local, national and global as well as interpenetrations between different hierarchies, 
especially those of class, gender and race/ethnicity. 
The Brazilian precariat, in the sense adopted here, corresponds to the segment of 
the population which lives at or below the poverty line and which either lives from 
social aid and other social transfers and/or occupies the positions least valued on the 
labor market, which includes strong participation in domestic labor. When we consider 
incomes, we observe that the size of the precariat was significantly reduced in the past 
decade. According to the data from the CEPAL (2016: 18), 30% of Brazilian households 
or 37.5% of the population were poor or indigent in 2001, falling respectively to 14.1% 
and 16.5% in 2013. The poor population continued to decline in 2014, although the 
aggravation of the economic crisis ever since could reverse this tendency since the 
number of unemployed in this group has increased significantly (Barufi 2016).
As far as the knowledge vector is concerned, if one considers the variable years of 
schooling, there has been a substantial increase in the situation of those considered 
poor and very poor in the official statistics: Between 2003 and 2013, the mean period 
of schooling for the poorest 40% of the population increased an average of 1.5 years, 
reaching 5.9 in 2014, while the richest 20% added close to one year more of schooling 
in the same period, averaging 10.8 years (IBGE 2014). The caveat should be added, 
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however, that the variable years of schooling can be illusory inasmuch as the extremely 
heterogeneous quality of education received during schooling for the richest who 
attend, in general, private primary and secondary schools, as opposed to the poorest 
who are enrolled in public schools; this quality gap is decisive for reproducing social 
hierarchies (Quadros 2008).
With regard to selective associations, there is no reason to believe that the precariat 
as such created new forms of special access to goods or socially coveted spaces in 
the period under consideration. Nevertheless, if we view the data on poverty, we can 
see that its reduction was slightly higher among the black population and women (IPEA 
2015), which might indicate a fall in the impact of the selective associations of whites 
and men on inequality.
Regarding existential rights, the expansion of social programs such as cash transfers 
and housing programs, besides the increase in the level of formalization of labor 
relations, even in less qualified jobs on the labor market, represents a considerable 
broadening of the existential rights of the poorest in the period until 2013. 
3.2.2 The Outsiders
The denomination of outsiders is of course not a self-attribution. It fits in the context of the 
established-outsider figuration described above and expresses the dynamic activated 
when formerly poor groups experience upward social mobility and increment their level 
of income and consumption, going on to dispute social spaces and consumer goods 
previously reserved for the established middle class. The reactions of the established 
cover the entire spectrum of privilege protection described by Elias and Scotson for the 
case of Winston Parva: public praise to those who accept the old hierarchy, mocking 
and public stigmatization of the “invaders” by means of jokes, pejorative nicknames, 
etc.
From the point of view of wealth, the increase in income and consumption capacity in 
the last decade is impressive in case of the outsiders10, that is, those who passed from 
the condition of poverty to become the “new middle class”. According to measurements 
carried out by Neri (2012: 27), no fewer than 39.6 million made this journey between 
2003 and 2011. The consumer power of this contingent explains, to a great extent, the 
enormous expansion of durable consumer goods observed in the last decade. The 
case of automotive vehicles is emblematic: Between 2001 and 2012, the number of 
automobiles in circulation in Brazil more than doubled from 24.5 million to 50.2 million, 
10 The potential to consume is largely fed by the extension of loans with real interest rates much higher 
than international parameters, which leads to increasing indebtedness among families (Lavinas 
2016). 
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while the number of motorcycles nearly quintupled, jumping from 4.5 million to 19.9 
million (Observatório das Metrópoles 2013).11 Yet, from 2014 on, the economic gains 
obtained by the outsiders remain more threatened than those in the remaining groups 
considered here, as the recent rise in dismissals affects this group particularly heavily 
(Barufi 2016).12 
With regard to knowledge measured by schooling, there is evidence that the outsiders 
benefitted substantially from the vertiginous expansion of higher education since 
2003, when the number of enrollments in institutions of higher education in Brazil 
jumped from 3.9 million to 7.3 million (MEC 2014: 26). The expansion of the university 
attendance of outsiders is due to, inter alia, the quota system introduced at the public 
universities and programs such as PROUNI and FIES, which offer grants or loans so 
that pupils with less purchasing power study at private institutions (MEC 2014). This 
does not necessarily imply a greater average increase in schooling among outsiders 
than among other groups, nor does it imply that schooling guarantees higher positions 
on the labor market. This is shown by studies that examine the stratification not by 
income, but rather by the composition of professional groups. In this way, in a study 
on the three occupational groups that form the middle class, including small business 
owners, professionals and administrators and routine non-manual workers, Scalon 
and Salata (2012) conclude that significant proportional growth of the Brazilian middle 
class in the past decade cannot be confirmed. The only group that grew is routine non-
manual workers, where newcomers could be employed in the middle class. However, 
this is a category which – in the words of the authors – is “fairly heterogeneous and 
[which] incorporates occupations with low prestige, autonomy in employment, stability 
and income, even though they are white collar” (Scalon and Scalata 2012: 397, for 
conceptual clarification see also the pioneering article, Scalon 1998).
Nevertheless, if we consider the positions in hierarchical social spaces as exclusive 
areas of leisure, consumption and the provision of services, it is evident that the 
increase in the outsiders’ consumer power shifts their position into these areas formerly 
11 While more or less equal percentages of different income quintiles (between nearly 20% and 25%) 
own motorcycles, ownership of automobiles is much more unequal: 14% of the poorest 20% and 
80.6% of the richest 20% owned a car in 2013 (IBGE 2014).
12 With the data used here, it is not possible to adequately evaluate these losses, only to indicate 
trends, seeing as Barufi’s estimates (2016) are based on the classification of 5 income groups, A to 
E. Class C incorporates both the outsiders and a part of the established in the division suggested 
here. For the sake of orientation, the distribution of the range of monthly family income utilized by 
Barufi, with values in reais from November 2015, are reproduced here:  RENDA MENSAL FAMILIAR
Class A: more than R$ 9954 
Class B: from R$ 6585 to R$ 9954
Class C: from R$ 1646 to R$ 6585
Class D: from R$ 995 to R$ 1646
Class E: less than R$ 995
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dominated by the established. With their loss of purchasing power since the beginning 
of the current crisis, however, this achievement of social status is threatened.
With respect to selective association, there is no evidence, as in the case of the 
precariat, that the outsiders managed to create organizations capable of guaranteeing 
them any privilege in the periods analyzed. Yet the reduction of gender and racial 
disparities in this segment highlight a reduction of power in the selective associations 
linked to gender and ethno-racial discrimination.
3.2.3 The Established
The reference to the established middle class operates here as a counterpart of the 
outsiders in the context of an interdependent web as defined by Elias (2004). It is not the 
case here of whether to define a precise income interval for the group of the established, 
seeing as this is not the principal criterion used for its definition as a class or stratum in 
this text. Nonetheless, in the sense of evaluating the dislocations in the social structure 
based on the five vectors of inequality selected, and resorting to the model of the five 
income classes A to E, we can affirm that this group corresponds to those that already 
found themselves in class C in 2003, in addition to the members of the classes A and 
B, excluding the millionaires, as analyzed further on. In this heterogeneous group, it is 
to be expected that the disputes in the context of the figuration established-outsider will 
be more intense the closer the established are to these outsiders in the social structure. 
From the point of view of wealth, if one takes into account the income variables, one 
sees that this group saw significant absolute gains in the period between 2003 and 
2011 (Neri 2012). From 2011 up to 2014, there was a rise in the number of Brazilians 
that belong to classes A, B, and C, with their share in the total income also increasing. 
Since then, however, there has been a fall in their share in the total income and the 
number of Brazilians belonging to these groups (Barufi 2016). Regarding property and 
other assets, taking into account tax returns, there was a clear rise in the wealth of the 
middle and high-income groups, at least in the years 2006, 2009 and 2012, according 
to information from Castro (2014).
With regard to schooling, the average number of years in school for the richest 40% 
grew by nearly a year between 2003 and 2013, reaching 9.4 years in 2014, a little 
behind the years of schooling added among the poorest. Particularly relevant is the 
growing participation of the poorest among the university population and the resulting 
decline in participation among the richest in this group. In 2004, the richest 20% of the 
population corresponded to 54.5% of the enrollments in public institutions and 68.4% 
in private ones. In 2014, the enrollment of this group in these institutions was 36.4% 
and 40.9%, respectively (IBGE 2014).
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There is no evidence that the established descended to inferior positions on the labor 
market, at least not in the period 2002 to 2009 analyzed by Scalon and Salata (2012), 
seeing as the ascent of the poorest to the highest white collar positions was not yet 
guaranteed in the majority of the years studied. Nevertheless, the loss of the positions 
of the established is evident in at least two contexts. The first, as referred to above, 
regards socially segmented spaces such as shopping malls, airports, leisure spaces, 
etc. in which the growing presence of outsiders has provoked reactions of repulse and 
rejection on the part of the established.13
The second loss of position for the established concerns a specific labor relation, that 
of domestic workers employed by nearly 7% of the employed population in Brazil. 
Between 2003 and 2013, the proportion of domestic workers with more than one job 
increased significantly and the proportion of them residing at their workplace became 
negligible. The income of domestic workers, even among those who only had one job, 
practically doubled in the period, and there was a slight increase in workers with a 
formal work contract (IPEA 2015). This implies the gradual disappearance of the model 
of exclusive domestic worker who is permanently at the disposition of the employer, 
without a clearly defined contract or working schedule. No longer able to count on the 
comprehensive provision of service at an extremely low cost, the middle stratum loses 
its social position and must undergoes important revisions of family arrangements based 
on the externalization of the costs of gender inequality. A 2015 law equalized the labor 
rights of domestic workers vis-à-vis other workers, which implies additional monthly 
costs of 7% for the employer. This additional cost associated with the valorization of 
the minimum wage represents an additional barrier for the middle stratum (Almeida 
2015).
Regarding the selective association, it seems reasonable to consider that, in the entire 
period, there was a reduction of the relative efficacy of those instruments which the 
established have at their disposal for their strategies of social closure. After all, even 
though rejected and ridiculed, outsiders made one major achievement in the access 
to social spaces – that of universities and shopping centers – that the established 
understood as being for their exclusive use. Finally, existential rights were not 
expanded, but they were not explicitly reduced in the period analyzed either. It is true 
that the perceptions concerning one’s own autonomy and development are negatively 
13 One case of “blame gossip” that can be seen as anecdotal yet which became paradigmatic for the 
public repercussion it received in social and mass media occurred in 2014. A university professor 
posted on her Facebook profile a photo of a man (who, as it later turned out, was a public prosecutor) 
dressed in a tank-top and Bermuda shorts in the terminal of the Santos Dumont Airport in Rio de 
Janeiro with the caption: “Airport or bus station?” Among many other posts that shared the indignation 
of the professor appeared: “The glamour of flying is definitely gone.” “This is only a sample of what 
I’ve seen in Brazil.” (Toledo 2014: 2)
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affected by the restrictions on attending exclusive spaces or employing domestic 
workers without any sort of contract or guarantee. However, this is a matter of losing 
privileges, not rights per se.
3.2.4 The Millionaires
There is surely a certain sociological arbitrariness to treating the richest 1% of a given 
population as a specific class or stratum among four considered groups. However, 
the importance they are acquiring in international debates on inequality, and the 
extraordinary percentage of wealth appropriated by them in Brazil, beyond their stronger 
resistance to crises, justify treating them as a group apart in the Brazilian stratification. 
Based on the data from income tax returns, Medeiros et al. (2015) conclude that the 
proportion of income appropriated by the richest 1% – namely, those who earned more 
than 203,100.00 reais a year in 2005 and since then rose again – recently reached 
25% of the total income of all Brazilians. Also starting from the the income tax returns, 
Milá (2015) conducted a longitudinal study on the evolution of the income of the richest 
1%, concluding that this fell between 1987 and 2005, yet rose again. However, it is 
reasonable to suppose that they are recently losing income in absolute terms, given 
the current downturn of the economy and the reduction of profits. The concentration of 
wealth, for its part, is even greater and more persistent. Castro (2014: 103) calculates 
the Gini coefficient for property and other assets at 0.860 in 2006 and 0.849 in 2012. 
In a total of around 25.6 million tax returns filed in Brazil in 2012, little more than 
400 thousand filers, that is, 1.5% of the total amount, declared a property value over 
1.5 million reais. These millionaires, corresponding to 0.2% of the total population, 
concentrated about 47% of all of the declared wealth (Castro 414: 103).
Based not on the income statements but on the PNAD household surveys (see IPEA 
2015), we know that the proportion of blacks among the richest 1% rose from 9.6% 
to 14.9% between 2003 to 2013. Among the richest 1%, we find entrepreneurs who 
employ others, but also rentiers as well as public employees and private companies 
in addition to pensioners. Based on the variations of schooling of the richest 20%, the 
group which millionaires belong to, one can assume that there was an increase in 
years of schooling in all of the period, although this has remained slightly lower than 
the average rise of schooling among the whole Brazilian population.
With regard to positions in hierarchical organizations, there are indications of shifts 
among the different sectors of the economy given the loss of industrial productivity, 
the gains of agribusiness in the past decade and the increment of financial gains. 
Nonetheless, the richest 1% maintain their prestigious positions in the economy. 
Even the loss of positions that affect the stability in hierarchical social spaces does 
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not directly reach the millionaires, given the great social and even spatial distance 
that separates them from the outsiders. Nor do the variations of the domestic labor 
market affect them, since their average monthly income reaches almost 100 times the 
minimum wage.
With relation to the selective association, the current investigations into corruption 
brought to the surface informal agreements and criminal networks among politicians, 
parties and large entrepreneurs, especially those in the construction industry (Anderson 
2016). This type of selective association constituted an effective strategy of social 
closure for the millionaires, guaranteeing a restricted group of the population privileged 
access to public funds. It is expected that investigations will at least reduce this type of 
selective association and its impact on social inequalities. Finally, regarding existential 
rights, there are no factors that indicate any reduction in their full validity for millionaires 
during the entire period studied.
The table below summarizes the shifts in the Brazilian social structure in accordance 
with has been described up to now:
Figure 2. Moves in Brazilian Social Structure, and 2003-2013 and 2014-16



























Precariat ↑ ↓ → → ↑ ↑ → → ↑ ↓
Outsiders ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ → → ↑ ↓
Established ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ → ↓ ↓ → →
Millionaires ↑ ↓ → → → → → ↓ → →
Legend: ↑: upward mobility; ↓: downward mobility; →: Stability 
Source: own elaboration 
4. Capital, Labor, State and the Crisis in Brazil
The movements observed in the Brazilian social structure correspond to shifts in the 
force field among state, capital and labor which, in turn, reflect relations of dependency 
and interdependency with the global context. These interdependencies concern, firstly, 
financial flows such as foreign investments, remissions of profit abroad or remittances 
of immigrants or other profits obtained by Brazilian companies abroad. These flows 
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affect the amount to be apportioned, in turn affecting the social distribution among the 
hubs capital, labor and state, as well as among the different social classes or strata. 
Another important component of these interdependencies is the Brazilian insertion in 
transnational production chains that were modified substantially in the period, given 
the retraction of industrial activity (Pochmann 2013). The growing specialization in 
commodity exports ensured that the persistent fall of the international price of raw 
materials since 2010 dragged the economy into a recession and altered the parameters 
of the internal distribution of income and wealth. Beside this, global moves observed 
in some sectors of the economy, such as the extensive subcontracting in the banking 
sector, dramatically modify the margin of maneuver of distributive negotiations at the 
national level, as Sproll (2013) shows.
At the political level, on the one hand, the amicable rhetoric concerning both national 
and foreign capital adopted by the Brazilian government in all of the period implied 
restrictions to economic policy and to the adoption of more radical redistributive 
measures, so as to maintain the so-called confidence of the markets. On the other 
hand, international law conventions ratified by the Brazilian government and even 
the transnationalization of social movements observed in this period influenced the 
national distributive game in favor of less privileged strata and groups, as in the case 
of women and blacks (Costa 2015).
If we consider the distribution of resources among the hubs capital, labor, and state, 
there was an increase in the participation of the state in the general distribution of income 
in the period considered. Tributary revenue went from 31.4% of the GNP in 2003 to 
33.5% in 2014 (Ministério do Planejamento 2015). When we observe the composition 
of the tributary load, however, the asymmetries of power among the three corporative 
hubs are fairly evident. In contrast to countries with a better income distribution that 
tax capital gain up to 42%, Brazil exempts profits and dividends from income tax. 
Levies on income, representing 26.5% of the total, and on the consumption of goods 
and services, representing 49.7%, formed the bulk of tax collection. (Castro 2014: 25, 
data from 2012). That is, if it is true that the PT governments augmented expenditures 
on social policies to combat poverty, there were no shifts as far as revenue was 
concerned: The model continued to be based on regressive indirect taxes, i.e. taxes 
which promote the concentration of income. In the period studied here, there was no 
organized movement whatsoever nor any systematic discussion in the Brazilian public 
space regarding the distributive consequences of this tributary structure, even though 
cash transfer programs (like Bolsa Família), which have had a negligible effect on 
income distribution, were a topic permanently discussed in all instances of the public 
space.
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Lula was elected president in 2002 with a government program which emphasized 
the fight against inequality (PT 2002). His votes were well distributed throughout the 
national territory and among the different income groups, with impressive results in 
larger cities and among better educated groups, the historical electoral bases of the 
PT. Starting with his reelection in 2006, a tendency was initiated that deepened with 
the election of Dilma Rousseff in 2010 and her reelection in 2014. From then on, Lula’s 
main electoral base and later that of his successor Rousseff began shifting more and 
more toward poorer groups, moving from the southeast toward the northeast of the 
country and from larger cities to smaller ones (Braig et al. 2015). The party’s discourse 
was also modified. While the redistribution of wealth did not disappear completely 
from the electoral programs, the focus did shift toward expanding the possibilities of 
consumption, the individual social mobility and the middle class. This appears succinctly 
in Dilma Rousseff’s government program presented in the electoral campaign in 2014:
In the first three administrations, the presidents, together with their allied 
parties, made the political decision to recognize rights of which, up to then, the 
immense majority of the population had been denied: residence, nourishment, 
study, access to health services, basic sanitation, one’s own home, employment 
and a minimum level of income to have a dignified life. By changing the living 
conditions of this enormous contingent of people, they were brought to the public 
sphere, conscious of their rights. These are the ones who entered the labor 
market better trained than the former workforce; who managed to get to college 
as the first in their nuclear families; who pressured the public authorities with 
demands for more and better quality services. […]. For Brazilian citizens, what 
is necessary for the future changed because the level of demands changed: 
They no longer want the bare minimum to live, but the maximum possible so 
that they maintain their power of consumption and can wave at their children, 
who have better lives than theirs” (PT 2014, underlining deleted).
Lula’s – and, with more emphasis, Rousseff’s – adherence to the discourse praising 
the “new middle class” became evident not only during electoral periods. It came to 
integrate daily public declarations by these governments and even marked decisions 
made by the Presidency of the Republic which, by means of the Secretary of Strategic 
Affairs, created a “Commission for the Definition of the Middle Class in Brazil” in 2011. 
In its final report, the Commission (2012: 7) sought to establish what is understood 
as “a definition which is conceptually solid, practical and easily understood by this 
group so that the quality of life of the new middle class can be continually monitored 
and its presence and aspirations incorporated into the design, implementation and 
operationalization of public policies.”
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Next to the political dedication to a new middle class, the commitment to fighting racial 
and gender discrimination is explicit in the discourse used by the presidents and in 
many of their government actions. In this way, special secretaries with the status of 
ministries were created in 2003, the first year of Lula’s government, to concentrate on 
policies in favor of women and the promotion of racial equality (Costa 2015).
At the political level, this set of discourses and actions are seen as a threat to the 
established characterized above. The losses are not economic, since the established 
increased their income and wealth in the period of 2003 to 2013. They faced losses of 
position in hierarchical contexts and a loss of efficacy of their selective associations 
to guarantee their strategies of social closure. Early on, some of the media began 
vocalizing the fear of the established, constructing the discourse of the “larmoyant” 
established middle class in opposition to the “jubilant” “new middle class” (the outsiders), 
using Therborn’s terminology discussed above. The magazine Veja and particularly its 
columnist Reinaldo Azevedo long ago became the voice of the established middle 
class, which is has been supposedly abandoned by the state, becoming a “victim” of 
the “gender ideology” and the “stupidity” of the racial quotas defended by the Workers’ 
Party:
Nowadays, the middle class is the real ‘black’ of Brazil: It pays abusive taxes, 
it does not use our terrible public services and is forced to assume its health, 
education and security costs alone […]. Let me remind you: Nobody protects 
the middle class, neither the state nor NGOs, churches … nothing (Azevedo 
2007: 106).
This kind of discourse, which combines defending the class position of the established 
with discrediting the fight against gender and racial discrimination, has been 
crystallizing with time into an anti-PT discourse. In the end, the party and many of its 
representatives, among them their most important leader, Lula, embody the invasion of 
the outsiders with their presence in social and political spaces formerly reserved for the 
established. Although the larmoyant discSourse of the established has accompanied 
the entire period in which the PT has occupied the government, their power to mobilize 
and articulate more representative portions of society remained latent as long as the 
Brazilian economy was growing at accelerated levels and the precariat, the outsiders 
and the millionaires saw their material and social condition improve. Intellectuals of 
the left and social movements remained equally marginal as they raised their voices 
to oppose the PT, objecting to the limits of the adopted redistributive policy and the 
excesses of the hardly sustainable economic model with its harmful consequences for 
the environment, the traditional populations and the quality of life in the cities.
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However, these critical discourses gained public resonance in the second half of Dilma 
Rousseff’s first mandate and, starting in June 2013, fed a series of public protests 
with marches and demonstrations in various Brazilian cities. The protests started with 
a movement for free public transport for students, therefore as a left-wing movement 
interested in extending the welfare state, but ended up growing and incorporating more 
general frustration with Dilma Rousseff’s government. Little by little, more right-wing 
movements of the political spectrum started to convoke and direct demonstrations 
which, despite adopting a generalized tone of critique of institutionalized politics, are 
becoming more and more distinctly a protest against the government and the Workers’ 
Party in general.14
In the parliamentary context, the PT never managed to hold even one fifth of the seats 
in Congress, despite having the most numerous fraction. This forced the party to 
establish alliances with the remaining parties. After the failure of the strategy of direct 
purchase of the loyalty of parliamentarians in 2005, the PT began – as mentioned 
above – to give ministries and positions to politicians and allied parties, who in turn 
administered directly their criminal associations with private initiatives. The PMDB 
became the most important allied party and was represented by Vice President Michel 
Temer when Dilma Rousseff won the elections in 2010 and 2014. In its own way, the 
model functioned fairly well until 2015, when a sweeping action against corruption 
in Brazilian politics was initiated, combining the forces of the judicial branch and the 
federal police. Besides impeding or at least limiting the access of politicians and parties 
to the channels for the generation of illicit resources that were lining their pockets, the 
attack generated panic among the politicians and entrepreneurs involved, due to the 
fear of being discovered and arrested, as has indeed happened in various cases. 
The investigations dismantled the bases upon which Dilma Rousseff’s parliamentary 
majority rested and, starting in 2015, a movement started to take form which sought to 
remove her from office. In May of 2016, the president was, initially, suspended for six 
months from her functions. Vice President Michel Temer assumed the role as head of 
government. 
In the context of public space, important changes also occurred. From the end of 2015 
on, in view of the worsening economic crisis, business groups led by the Federation 
of Industries of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São 
Paulo - FIESP) entered into a political dispute in favor of deposing the president. At 
the same time, as the possibility of impeachment became more and more imminent, 
14 The initiator of the majority of the protests in the period was the Free Brazil Movement (Movimento 
Brasil Livre), whose program is based on the defense of deregulation and generalized privatization 
in all sectors and services, from education to prisons. The movement also defends the “end of the 
social function of property. Private property cannot be relativized” (Movimento Brasil Livre 2015).
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 99 | 23
social movements and intellectuals who, in previous years, had distanced themselves 
from the PT, rearticulated themselves to organize a reaction to what they saw as a 
parliamentary coup d’état against a president who was legitimately elected by popular 
vote. In this way, public protests began to alternate between those who, starting in 
2013, were organizing demonstrations against the PT, and those who went out on 
the street to support the president. The average level of schooling and income of the 
demonstrators both in favor of and against the impeachment were much higher than 
the Brazilian average, indicating that the precariat and a large part of the outsiders 
were absent from the demonstrations (Alonso 2016). It comes as no surprise that more 
educated groups are the ones opposing the attempts to end the hegemony of the left. 
They are acting as advocates of social justice, to the extent that they foresaw that 
distributive changes will be even more unfavorable for the poorest, women, and blacks 
in a government commanded by President Rousseff’s adversaries.
5. Conclusion
When defining social classes based on a multidimensional perspective, contributions 
that seek to reconcile Marxist and Weberian traditions in the analysis of social structure 
are indispensable to comprehending distributive conflicts in contemporary societies. By 
shifting to works that combine these two analytical traditions, the present text sought 
to study the contemporary Brazilian political crisis as a distributive conflict involving 
four classes or strata (precariat, outsiders, established, millionaires), defined using 
five determinant vectors of social inequality: wealth, position, knowledge, selective 
association and existential rights. The definition of these classes or strata considered 
the social trajectory traversed by each group since 2003 rather than the position 
occupied in the social structure at a particular moment.
Generally speaking, the four classes or strata considered saw their wealth and their 
knowledge grow in the period between 2003 and 2013. Their existential rights increased 
or at least remained stable in this period. With relation to position and selective 
association, the movement observed between 2003 and 2013 is fairly discrete for the 
different classes: While the precariat and outsiders ascended significantly in their social 
position, the established lost social position to the extent that their power to exclude 
outsiders from social spaces formerly reserved for their own usage diminished. The 
same logic applies to selective associations with regard to gender and race. Even 
though gender and ethno-racial equality are far from being achieved in Brazil, between 
2003 and 2013, there was a decrease in the power of men and whites to discriminate 
against women and blacks. This loss of position in the hierarchies of class, gender and 
race fed the resentment of the established against the PT government even in times 
when, in terms of wealth, they experienced an ascendant trajectory.
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Starting in 2014, the picture changed. The exacerbation of the economic crisis caused 
all of the groups, especially the outsiders, to lose income.  The reduction of vacancies 
on the formal market produced a loss of existential rights, particularly for the precariat 
and outsiders. The established, though less threatened by the outsiders (the most 
affected by the crisis), also experienced social decline as the recession advanced. 
Finally, the millionaires who had until then been gaining at all of the levels of inequality 
with the PT governments, lost at least part of their selective associations as the 
investigations into corruption advanced and their criminal networks with the state and 
politicians were dismantled. It is precisely when the millionaires began to lose that the 
representative associations such as the FIESP entered into the political dispute in the 
public space. It is also at this moment that the effective changes in favor of the removal 
of the president began to occur. The impression that remains is that the established, 
given the resonance of their positions and opinions in the mass media, constitute a 
decisive actor in the formation of public opinion. Nevertheless, the formation of political 
will, in the sense of the agglutination of decisions with a binding effect, still depends on 
the dispositions of the millionaires. When they understood that their capital interests 
were threatened and their privileged channels of access to the state were obstructed, 
they joined the political fight unfolding in the public sphere, deciding the game in their 
favor. This was at least the partial result of the dispute among capital, state and labor 
at the end of July 2016.
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